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"Unwise," "Untimely," and "Extreme"

INTRODUCTION
In 1963, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. penned his classic Letter from a
Birmingham Jail' to respond to eight of Alabama's most prominent white
clergymen who criticized him in a local newspaper's public
advertisement. In their "Call For Unity," the eight white clergy appealed
for "law and order and common sense," and admonished the civil rights
leader, asserting that the laws should be "peacefully obeyed."2 They
called upon their "own Negro community to withdraw support from
these demonstrations," viewing King's non-violent protests as "unwise
and untimely" and "extreme measures." They felt the
protest was
3
unjustified in Birmingham and "led in part by outsiders."
Dr. King's powerful response explained not only to the clergymen but
to the world "why we can't wait" for social change. King further
reminded the clergy that he came to Birmingham "because injustice is
here."'
This was not a difficult claim for King to make, since
Birmingham enjoyed a reputation of being one of the south's most
segregated cities and also for having the greatest number of unsolved
bombings of Black churches and homes of civil rights leaders.
It is far easier today to recognize the paternalism, privilege, and
paucity of understanding that underlies the Birmingham Eight's
message. At the time, however, the sentiments expressed by the eight
clergy reflected a dominant view among white moderates who desired
change in race relations in the south. As one scholar of the controversy
attempts to argue, these were not evil men, nor allies of the
segregationist regime, but some of Birmingham's most progressive
leaders.7 Indeed, it is this very dynamic - to be criticized by those who
claim to be one's ally, albeit an under-informed, if not arrogant, one that
' Martin Luther King Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), reprinted in S.
JONATHAN BASS, BLESSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS 237-56 (2001).

' The White Ministers' Good Friday Statement (Apr. 12, 1963) reprinted in S. BASS,
supra note 1, at 235-36.
3 Id.
' Dr. King admonished his brethren: "For years now I have heard the word, 'Wait.' It
rings in the ear of every Negro with piercing familiarity. This 'Wait' has always meant
never.' We must come to see, with one of our distinguished jurists, that 'justice too long
delayed is justice denied."' See BASS, supranote 1, at 242.

5 Id.
' W. Ralph Eubanks, Before He Had His "Dream," King Wrote Letter, WASH.

POST, Jan.
16, 2005, at B3.
' See generally BASS, supra note 1 (advocating for more complicated and sympathetic
depiction of eight ministers addressed in Dr. King's "Letter from a Birmingham Jail").
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Dr. King addresses so poignantly:
I have almost reached the conclusion that the Negro's great
stumbling block in the stride to freedom is not the White
Citizen's Council or the Ku Klux Klan, but the white moderate,
who is more devoted to "order than justice; who prefers a
negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive
peace which is the presence of justice'; who constantly says: 'I
agree with you in the goal that you seek but I cannot agree with
your methods of direct action'; who paternalistically believes
that he can set the time-table for another man's freedom; who
lives by the myth of time and who constantly advises the Negro
to wait for a 'more convenient season.' Shallow understanding
from people of good will is more frustrating than absolute
misunderstanding from people of ill will. 8
I start this paper on employment discrimination and norms of
"collegiality" with the "Letter from a Birmingham Jail" because I can't help
but wonder how Dr. King would have fared had his actions occurred in
the workplace as opposed to civil society. Imagine that Dr. King was
employed at the same workplace as the Birmingham Eight, and that in
response to segregation and violent acts directed towards African
Americans at the workplace, Dr. King undertook measures to protest
such acts. Of course, one must also imagine that as an employee, Dr.
King enjoyed the protections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under these
assumptions, how might the employer have fared if it fired Dr. King
citing lack of "collegiality" or "inability to get along" in response to any
racial discrimination or retaliation claim contesting the firing? With
eight co-workers who claimed to support his end goal but denouncing
his measures as "extreme," might a court hearing such a case conclude
that King's disruptiveness was for a "legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason?" 9 Would the Court find that his dismissal was not a "pretext"

See BASS, supra note 1, at 246.
As set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
the burden shifting proof structure for inferential cases of employment discrimination
under Title VII entails three steps. First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case in
which she demonstrates that 1) she was a member of a protected group under Title VII; 2)
she was qualified for and applied for a job; 3) she was denied the position; and 4) the
employer continued to search for candidates to fill the position. Second, once a prima facie
case is established, the burden shifts to the employer to merely articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action in question. Finally, after the
employer articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason offered is a pretext for discrimination. Tex. Dep't of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05;
9
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for discrimination or retaliation? Unfortunately, courts overwhelmingly
defer to the employers' stated rationale of "collegiality" as a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for an adverse employment action.
Moreover, courts consistently fail to inquire into how linked or
derivative the underlying act of discrimination grieved by the employee
is to the perception of incivility by the employer. °
I use this hypothetical to illustrate how the legal treatment of an
employer's non-collegiality rationale for its challenged actions may have
seriously deleterious effects upon the individual claimant, and
ultimately, the broader public interest, in creating and sustaining more
equitable worksites. Insofar as fee-shifting statutes for civil rights
litigation were enacted in part to create a "private attorney's general" to
carry out congressional intent to root out and eliminate discriminatory
practices, it seems inconsistent that what is granted by the political
branch on one hand, is taken away by the hand of the legal branch.
What good are fee-shifting statutes to promote private lawsuits if courts
are overly deferential in crediting an employer's stated reason for its
actions in the determination of discrimination pretext?
I argue in this paper that courts' historic recognition of and deference
to the collegiality justification grossly undervalues the role of positive
social change in the workplace. In part, the courts' error derives from
too narrow a conceptualization of collegiality. The traditional concept of
workplace "collegiality," popularly understood as the ability to get along
well with others, clearly lacks substance. "Collegial" is what those in
power happen to define it as at the time. As such, it absorbs the
normative values of the dominant culture. Thus, the utter malleability of
the term poses the same dangers to particular identity groups as any
other doctrine or rule that suffers from over-vagueness.
A traditional, dominant culture definition of collegiality fails to
account for institutional sexism, homophobia, racism, etc., and thus
endorses and perpetuates existing cultural norms and castes. Under this
"can't we all get along" formulation, those who transgress the cultural
norm of gendered and racial hierarchy appear to be "impolite" and
"uncollegial" regardless of history, context, or power relations. If, for
example, one works in an embedded culture of institutional
heteropatriarchy and white supremacy, then even minimal resistance to
see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000).
,0 Mary Ann Connell & Frederick G. Savage, The Role of Collegiality in Higher Education
Tenure, Promotion, and Termination Decisions, 27 J.C. & U.L. 833, 858 (2001) (summarizing
how courts have rejected plaintiff arguments that collegiality was used as pretext for
discrimination "in the overwhelming number of reported cases").
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such a culture will likely result in a seeming breach of collegiality. In
this sense, collegiality serves to normalize workplace injuries to outsider
groups serving as an effective hegemonic censor of race- and genderbased resistance to oppression. I refer to these dominant, uncritical
conceptualizations of collegiality as "hegemonic collegiality"- i.e., those
definitions of collegiality that do not take into account the normative
ideal of equalization of power relations among colleagues.
It is interesting to note that Webster's Dictionary actually defines the
term "collegial" in a more power-sensitive way than the term is
commonly used in the workplace and employed by courts. According to
this definition, "collegial" refers to something "characterized by or
having authority vested equally among colleagues."" Thus, absent an
equal sharing of authority, collegiality cannot exist. Because such an
equal sharing of authority does not exist across race and gender lines at
most workplaces, collegiality among disparate power groups should be
viewed as a problematic, conflict-laden prospect. At the very least,
collegiality should be seen as an often unarticulated job requirement that
may have a disparate impact on the material (and emotional) well-being
of people of color and women. Indeed, it could be argued that under
unequal social conditions, the struggle to bring about workplace equality
(and to resist oppressive cultures) is the true measure of collegiality since
it contributes to the equalization of power. I will refer to this more
critical conceptualization as "transformative collegiality." Transformative
collegiality takes into account the end goal of producing equal sharing of
authority among colleagues, in light of race, gender and sexuality among
other divides.
In this paper, I examine more closely the role of "collegiality" in
employment discrimination cases to reveal the operation of
contemporary discrimination through neutral sounding means. I also
consider how such norms and standards applied in employment settings
may operate to the disadvantage of intersectional subjects, particularly
women of color. In addition to the narrow, hegemonic definition of
collegiality that favors employers, contemporary employment
discrimination laws vex plaintiffs by their inability to ferret out the
superficial denials and explanations of increasingly sophisticated
employers, human resources administrators, and general counsels. In a
post-civil rights society professing to be "colorblind," most employers

" WEBSTER'S ONLINE DICTIONARY,

THE ROSETrA EDMON, http://www.websters-

online-dictionary.org/definition/collegial (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
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know that there should be no public pronouncements of their intent to
discriminate.
In Part I, I will explore the specific dynamics of the operation of the
"collegiality trump card" by scrutinizing the facts in such cases in which
"not getting along" forms the basis for the employer's defense. This Part
will examine the standards employed by courts to ascertain whether
collegiality operates as a pretext for discrimination. Drawing upon
federal claims of race- and/or sex-based discrimination or harassment, I
will analyze courts' operational definitions of collegiality that are
(implicitly) applied in the proof structures of Title VII. I argue that
judicial interpretations of antidiscrimination law too often permit
traditional, power-insensitive definitions of collegiality to frustrate
claims of plaintiffs experiencing a hostile, unequal workplace.
Unfortunately, courts seldom have acknowledged the link between
dominant operative definitions of collegiality and the perpetuation of onthe-job racial and sexual harassment and discrimination. Instead, courts
have uncritically credited employer rebuttals of discriminatory
inferences that are based on an employee's alleged lack of "collegiality."
Part II examines the emerging legal literature on the increasing use of
employer deployments of "collegiality" and the limitations and dangers
of such a defense, primarily as violative of academic freedom. I suggest
that judicial deference granted to the significance of collegiality in the
workplace tends to operate as a trump card against assertions of
discrimination, hostile environment, or retaliation. I further argue that
courts should curtail their deference to employers' collegiality rationale.
Following judicial and scholarly treatment of the "collegiality"
rationale, I will make a few modest suggestions in Part III to improve
judicial analysis of an employer's collegiality-based rebuttal. I will also
explore strategies for workers and subjects in hostile environments or
unequal workplaces to deploy in redressing their grievances in light of
post civil rights era dynamics. For as the first decades of Critical Race
Theory reveal, legal reforms are but a starting point (if that) for the
realization of a racially just society.
This paper will conclude that a more nuanced and enlightened
definition of collegiality must be applied if it is to determine outcomes in
workplace disputes and litigation. A better definition of collegiality will
recognize power imbalances and oppressive cultures, and be supportive

"' I thank Professor Margaret Montoya for reminding me of the importance of
discussing cultural strategies for empowerment and survival in light of the increasingly
conservative trend of the courts in employment discrimination doctrine.
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of challenges thereto. Absent such legal and cultural changes, the
successful deployment of hegemonic collegiality to rebut employment
discrimination claims fosters a form of race- and gender-based
"censorship" - one that is imposed externally through the courts'
recognition of the employer-defendant's collegiality-based rebuttal of the
allegation of discrimination, and internally through the operation of the
culture of hegemonic collegiality itself.
I.

THE LEGAL DOCTRINE AND CULTURAL CONTEXT OF HEGEMONIC
COLLEGIALITY

I refer to the culture of hegemonic collegiality as the set of norms that
demand that subordinated groups conform their behavior and
interactions to the expectations of the group in power in order to "get
along."
Such concessions are expected regardless of any
antidiscrimination or egalitarian policies in place. Any workplace
ruptures or disagreements that occur are judged by standards developed
but not necessarily articulated by the dominant majority culture.
Hegemonic collegiality fails to account for power dynamics or
differentials when assessing the "reasonableness" or lack thereof of
workplace behaviors.
The doctrine of hegemonic collegiality refers to courts' uncritical
embrace of the perpetrator's norms to define the baseline for getting
along in the workplace. Specifically, the problem arises where courts
"double credit" the collegiality-based rationale first as an employer's
"legitimate non-discriminatory reason" ("LNR") for an adverse
employment action, and then again at the pretext stage, to defeat a
plaintiff's showing of pretext. To allow an employer to prevail at the
pretext stage due to the plaintiff's alleged uncollegiality produces a
Kafka-esque result in which the perpetrators may inflict a "second
injury" to a plaintiff by not only discriminating, harassing, and/or
retaliating against her, but also by converting the victim into a
"troublemaker." As such, the employer suggests that the employee is
responsible for her own undoing and unpopularity with co-workers or
colleagues.
A.

Individual DisparateTreatment Cases

The cases discussed below illustrate Title VII claims in which the
employer asserted some version of the "collegiality rationale" by arguing
that the reason for the employer's adverse decision making against the
plaintiff involved her inability to "get along." If analyzed under the
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McDonnell-Douglas single motive proof structure, Courts may interpret
the "collegiality" rationale as either the employer's "real reason" for
adverse employment action, or as "pretext.', 13 Using mixed motive
analysis, courts may consider the "collegiality rationale" as the
motivating, albeit illegitimate, reason for taking adverse action against
the employee that serves to inoculate the employer against most
meaningful monetary damages. 4 In either case, note to what extent
courts allow employers simply to rearticulate the plaintiff's injury into
the plaintiff's shortcomings. Note also the level of deference courts grant
to employers articulating a collegiality rationale, even where the
complained about action and lack of collegiality resulted from the same
set of facts.
1.

Early Case: McKenna v. Caspar Weinberger: "The Effective Cause
of Her Own Dismissal"

In McKenna v. Caspar Weinberger 15the female plaintiff alleging Title VII
sex discrimination/retaliation was denied relief in federal district court
in the District of Columbia. The court denied her relief on the basis of
her "personality difficulties" in which over-aggressiveness and
abrasiveness were emphasized. 16 These alleged personality defects and
McKenna's inability to get along with others constituted the defendant's
LNR to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie inference of discriminatory
treatment.
7 On appeal, the court upheld the lower court's finding of nonliability.1

In McKenna, the female plaintiff was a probationary employee of the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) who alleged sex-based discrimination
and retaliation upon her termination. Ms. McKenna had recounted
numerous unrebutted incidents in which women had been "treated
condescendingly, were sexualized or had suggestive remarks directed at
them.
Additionally, obscene jokes, cartoons or photos were
conspicuously exchanged." 8 Ms. McKenna filed a claim with Captain
3

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.

" See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5 (2005) (limiting relief in mixed motive cases in which employer demonstrates she
would have made "same decision" in absence of illegitimate, motivating factor to
declaratory relief, injunctive relief, or attorney's fees).
15 McKenna v. Weinberger, 729 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
6 Id. at 790.
Id. at 791.
, Id. at 786-87. As this case precedes the legal recognition of a "hostile environment
claim" announced in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), the plaintiff did not
"
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Martinez, the superior of one of her supervisors. Martinez ordered an
investigation into whether there was sexist bias in the failure to promote
McKenna or in her work environment. Shortly after her complaint to
Captain Martinez, McKenna was terminated.
In its defense, the DIA claimed that sex discrimination played no part
in the failure to promote Ms. McKenna. Rather, her promotion denial
was due to her inability to get along with her (male) coworkers.
According to the trial court record, Ms. McKenna's supervisor, who had
previously given her a positive evaluation, testified that three of
McKenna's coworkers (all male) complained that she was "abrasive and
uncooperative." 9 At trial, the defendant's nondiscriminatory, legitimate
reason for firing McKenna was stated as her "abrasiveness and
continuing difficulties in working with her fellow analysts." 20 In classic
"blame-the-victim" language, the district court found in favor of the
DIA, concluding that "Ms. McKenna herself was the source of the
problem and the effective cause of her own dismissal. ,21
Upon review, the DC appeals court expressed concern over the lower
court's finding: "We are troubled that the vague complaints of three men
who were never heard at trial played such a critical role in Ms.
McKenna's downfall. " 22 In fact, the appellate court acknowledged a Title
VII violation would exist where male co-workers' sexism frustrates
female plaintiff's attempt to work cooperatively with others.
Nevertheless, the appellate court left the district court opinion
undisturbed, concluding that the record overall was sufficient to support
a finding of nondiscrimination. Without stating any test or standard by
which workplace sexism would be isolated from the determination of a
woman's collegiality, the appellate court affirmed the district court's
finding that the plaintiff's inability to get along with her coworkers was a
"function of her individual personality difficulties and was not related to
her sex. " 23
The lack of collegiality similarly provided the

assert a sexual harassment claim. Instead, the claim is analyzed under a McDonnell-Douglas
three-part burden shifting proof structure. See supranote 9.
19 McKenna, 729 F.2d at 786.
20 Id. at 789.
21

22

Id.
Id.

Id. at 790; see also McCarthney v. Griffin-Spalding County Bd. of Educ., 791 F.2d
1549, 1550-51 (11th Cir. 1986) (upholding district court's judgment for employer on basis
that nondiscriminatory reason articulated for female employee's non-promotion - i.e.,
appellant's "inflexible, overly aggressive, and abrasive" personality - was not clearly
erroneous); Ayon v. Sampson, 547 F.2d 446, 450 (9th Cir. 1976) (affirming lower court's
grant of summary judgment to employer dismissing female appellant's sex discrimination

20061

"Unwise," "Untimely," and "Extreme"

nondiscriminatory rationale to support dismissal of the retaliation claim.
The McKenna case reflects the court's embrace of a traditional notion of
collegiality that is unable to separate out oppressive power relations
from the determination of appropriate behavior toward one's peers. The
office dynamics - the sexist condescension, suggestive remarks and
offensive language, joking, and photos - that gave rise to Ms.
McKenna's objections, eventually led to her lawsuit. Predictably,
McKenna's co-workers who produced the hostile office dynamics would
negatively characterize her resistance to the sexist working conditions,
thereby producing a conflict-oriented work environment. Thus, her
inability to "get along" with colleagues in such an infected environment
should not be allowed to support the employer's rebuttal. Absent a
power-sensitive definition of collegiality, the conflation of a plaintiff's
perceived lack of collegiality and resistance to discriminatory treatment
will penalize those who seek to rectify impermissible discrimination and
harassment. Certainly, Title VII could not have intended such a result.
•

2.

24

"Mixed Motive" Cases and Price-Waterhouse: "Overly
Aggressive, Unduly Harsh" and "Universally Disliked"

It could be argued that the McKenna case and others like it decided
prior to the 1989 Price-Waterhousev. Hopkins case are no longer significant
in light of the legal standard now controlling mixed motive cases. Prior
to Price-Waterhouse, circumstantial cases of employment discrimination
were analyzed under the three-step, burden-shifting proof structure
established in McDonnell Douglas v. Green,2' which considered whether a
"single motive" of discriminatory animus accounted for the adverse
employment action. In Price-Waterhouse, the Court recognized a more
complex decision making possibility, that the adverse employment

claim on basis of her "personality problems, and not because of her sex"). Again, the
appellate court noted, but dismissed the operation of sexism in the determination of
collegiality:
We are unable to say that the ability to get along with one's co-workers would
not be an important qualification for an individual in a management position, or
that a selecting official could not give substantial weight to that factor in making
his selection.
While such a selection process is dependent upon the
individualized judgment of the selecting official and is therefore subject to
opportunities for subtle discrimination, we find none here.
Id. at 451.
2 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
See supra note 9.

University of California,Davis
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action could be the product of "mixed motives," both legitimate and
21
illegitimate.
Price-Waterhouse involved a female candidate, Ann Hopkins, up for
partnership in an accounting firm. Like McKenna, Ms. Hopkins was
criticized for her uncollegial behavior. According to one partner, she
was "universally disliked" by staff. In contrast to the McKenna-type
case, the Supreme Court found the employer's articulated
nondiscriminatory reason for non-promotion to be inadequate - i.e.,
Hopkins' allegedly deficient interpersonal skills and "overly aggressive,
unduly harsh" personality.2
However, what may distinguish Price-Waterhouse from the McKennatype case is the existence of overtly sex-based comments. In PriceWaterhouse, Hopkins was counseled to "walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled,
and wear jewelry." 29 District Court Judge Gesell concluded at trial that
being identified as a "women's libber" at Price-Waterhouse "was
regarded as [a] negative comment. " 30 Hopkins was also described as
"macho," in need of "charm school," and a "tough-talking somewhat
masculine hard-nosed manager." 31 With the assistance of an expert
witness, the Court interpreted such sex-based comments as evidence of
gender-based stereotyping in the workplace.

26 In Price-Waterhouse, the Court sets forth the new "mixed motive" proof structure.
First, the plaintiff must establish that discriminatory animus was a motivating factor in the
adverse employment action. Should the plaintiff prevail, then the burden shifts to the
employer to prove by preponderance of the evidence that he would have made the "same
decision" in the absence of discriminatory animus. Price-Waterhouse,490 U.S. at 242. The
Price-Waterhouse Court stated that an employer could escape liability once the "same
decision" defense was successfully invoked. However, Congress rejected the Court's
formulation of liability, and passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 which provided for the
establishment of liability once impermissible motive has been identified as a "motivating
factor." Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (1991). Should
the employer be able to prevail at the "same decision" phase, then the plaintiff is limited to
certain forms of equitable relief such as declaratory and injunctive relief as well as
attorney's fees.
Price-Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 237-38. Justice O'Connor's oft-cited
concurring opinion in Price-Waterhouse advocated for a "direct evidence" threshold to
trigger the mixed motive analysis. Id. at 270-71 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see Desert Palace
v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003) (clarifying that direct evidence is not necessary, only
"substantial evidence" - either direct or indirect - would suffice to trigger mixed motive
analysis).
27 Price-Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
"

Id.

29

Id.
Id. at 236.

31 Id. at 235.
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It's important to note that the McKenna case may survive the mixedmotive analysis subsequently announced in Price-Waterhouse. The
inability of Hopkins to get along with her staff was deemed an
insufficient rebuttal of Hopkins' discrimination claims because
illegitimate reasons had also motivated the decision. Price-Waterhouse,
then, fails to interpret a protected group member's alleged lack of
collegiality as socially constructed. It merely prohibits an otherwise
"legitimate" non-discriminatory reason (inability to get along) from
grounding an employer's rebuttal where substantial evidence of
illegitimate
decision-making
exists
(here, impermissible
sex
stereotyping).
3.

Love-Lane v. Martin:32 A "Personality Conflict" with "Nothing to
Do with Race"

Love-Lane v. Martin is a recent case in which an African American
female sued the local school board and superintendent over her
demotion from assistant principal to teacher, alleging racial
discrimination and retaliation for her protest of racial discrimination in
the discipline of students. 33 Ms. Love-Lane had worked as an assistant
principal at four different elementary and middle schools in the
Winston-Salem, North Carolina area before she was assigned to the
32 Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766 (4th Cir. 2004); see also Kirk v. Hitchcock Clinic,
261 F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir. 2001) (upholding summary judgment by lower court that found
that plaintiff failed to demonstrate by preponderance of evidence that employer's proffered
justification for adverse employment action - i.e., whistleblower-plaintiff's alleged "lack
of collegiality" - was pretextual). See generally Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610
(11th Cir. 2004). In this case, Carole Stavropoulos, was hired in 1993 as an assistant
professor in the School of Art at the University of Georgia. She received excellent
performance reviews in 1993 and 1994. In fall of 1994, she was asked to serve on the hiring
committee for a computer artist position. Two of the five committee members, including
Stavropoulos, determined that a female candidate was the best qualified. But the other
three voted for an internal male candidate already employed by the School of Art.
Professor Stavropoulos perceived this result to be unfair pre-selection. The two dissenters
filed a minority report with the Dean of the School of Art. With the assistance of Professor
Stavropoulos, the non-selected female candidate sent a letter to the university legal
department stating she believed she was a victim of gender discrimination.
Despite receiving excellent reviews again in 1995, the faculty voted not to renew
Professor Stavropoulos' contract in June of 1995, with several faculty members citing the
candidate's lack of collegiality that "was insulting and hostile to her fellow faculty
members." Id. at 613. Stavropoulos appealed the non-renewal successfully, and sued the
university for retaliation and violation of First Amendment rights. Id. at 615. On appeal of
the district court's grant of summary judgment on both claims, the 11th Circuit upheld the
lower court on the basis of no adverse employment action since the internal university
appeals process returned her to the faculty. Id. at 621.
" Love-Lane, 355 F.3d. at 768
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Lewisville school.m At each of these prior schools, she received
performance reviews that rated her excellent or superior in all aspects of
her job, with problem-solving and communications being among her
strongest "skill-sets."
When Ms. Love-Lane was assigned to Lewisville (a suburban school
with a predominantly middle to upper-class white student body with
some poor and working-class African American children bused in), the
superintendent explained that "an African-American presence" was
needed there. B The teaching staff at Lewisville was "overwhelmingly
white" with anywhere from two to six African American teachers at the
school out of about one hundred during the time Love-Lane was
assigned there.37 The superintendent readily acknowledged that "there
were some problematic situations [at Lewisville] in terms of racial
perceptions," and that African American parents viewed the school and
the white female principal, Brenda Blanchfield, "negatively.
At one
faculty meeting when the faculty were discussing when to meet for a
satellite PTA meeting, Blanchfield stated, "it did not matter what time
the meeting was held since nobody [in that predominantly African
American neighborhood] works anyway." 39 In another instance, the
principal referred to "CP time" or "colored people's time.",4 Love-Lane
accepted the assignment to Lewisville after extracting a promise from
Superintendent Martin that he would "monitor" the situation. 41
Soon after her arrival, Ms. Love-Lane discovered a troubling
disciplinary practice of teachers disproportionately referring African
American boys to the "time out room" for "misbehaving" without
proper guidelines for doing so or safeguards to prevent excessive use of
the room. 42 Love-Lane noticed some students were sent to the
disciplinary room for the most minor of infractions and that the room
often operated at "standing room only" without any trained staff to

m Id. at 769.
Id.
3
Id.
Id. at 770.
Id. In particular, Love-Lane had articulated her concerns that she had heard that the
principal, Brenda Blanchfield, had difficulty with African American assistants and that the
principal had been ineffective or insensitive in addressing the problems and concerns of the
Black community. Id.
'7

a' Id.

Id. at 769.
41 Id.

1I Id. at 770.
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supervise activities. 43 After holding her tongue the first year, Ms. LoveLane began to speak out at faculty meetings during her second year at
Lewisville about practices and policies she felt were discriminatory to
African American and poor white students. She once saw, for example,
a teaching assistant "with her foot in a little Black boy's back as he lay on
the floor crying." 44 She also objected to the exclusion of a number of
African American and poor white students from a class trip for
seemingly minor infractions absent any established criteria for
exclusion. Some of the teachers being criticized for overusing the timeout room and "warehousing" African American boys there resented
Love-Lane's criticisms and her allegedly "disrespectful tone" towards
them.46 Despite receiving a superior evaluation after her first year, and
excellent ratings for her work in most areas in her second year, Ms. LoveLane received lower marks for her communications skills, with the
principal finding that 85 percent of the teachers found her "intimidating"
47
and that they objected to her "direct style of communication.
Although Ms. Love-Lane complained directly to superintendent
Martin about her perceptions of racial discrimination, he discounted her
concerns that Black students were being "denied equal access to
education" stating that he "did not agree with her assessment of the
situation." 48 At the end of the second year, Love-Lane requested transfer
after the superintendent ignored a second complaint by her about the
treatment of African American students. At the close of the second year,
Love-Lane was involved in an incident with another teacher in which
each accused the other of using profanity. Principal Blanchfield issued a
letter of reprimand to both, and the superintendent investigated after
Love-Lane filed a complaint, but concluded that Blanchfield's
reprimands were justified, that "race had nothing to do with [LoveLane's problems]" which he deemed a "personality conflict." 49 He also
warned her that another such outburst would be grounds for dismissal. 5
Ms. Love-Lane continued to protest what she perceived as unfair racial
treatment, and ultimately was demoted to teacher by the principal and
assigned to another school.
Principal Blanchfield noted on her

43 Id.

Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 770-71.
47 Id. at 772.
48

Id.

I4
d. at 773.
50 Id.
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evaluation memo that she considered Love-Lane's "continued vocal
opposition to our 51implementation of the Time-Out Room as blatant
disrespect for me."
Love-Lane sued, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation for
exercising her First Amendment right to free speech. At trial, the district
court granted summary judgment on both claims to the defendants. On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld summary judgment on the racial
discrimination claim, but reversed on the First Amendment-based
retaliation claim. In rejecting Ms. Love-Lane's racial discrimination
claim, the court credited the defendant employer's "collegiality"
rationale:
The defendants contend that Love-Lane was reassigned because she
demonstrated a complete inability to work effectively under
Blanchfield and because she failed to meet the expectations laid out
for her by [the superintendent] ... that she had to respect the
authority of 5her
2 principal, register her disagreements in private, and
rebuild trust.
The Fourth Circuit explained that while they reversed on the free
speech-retaliation claim, "the fact that Love-Lane has a viable free speech
claim does not automatically mean that she has a viable race
discrimination claim... Love-Lane must demonstrate ... that she was
reassigned because of her race.' 3 Even more curious, the court
determined that Love-Lane's evidence "demonstrates that racial tensions
were high at Lewisville during the Blanchfield administration and that
Blanchfield herself made racially insensitive comments
4 on at least two
occasions, though neither was directed at Love-Lane."5
The court relied excessively on the defendant superintendent's
determination that Blanchfield's investigation into the altercation
incident was not racial. The court also accepted uncritically, the
employer's refraining of racial discrimination as legitimate, nondiscriminatory "personality conflict" to grant summary judgment on Ms.
Love-Lane's race claim.5" The grant of summary judgment under these
factual circumstances is particularly troubling considering that courts are
supposed to review the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
s' Id. at 774.
52 Id. at 788.
53 Id.
Id.

s Id. at 788-89.
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Price-Waterhouseprovided some initial optimism that the Court's new
"mixed motive" framework might offer effective relief for plaintiffs
seeking relief from employment discrimination, and more specifically,
from the employer's "blame-the-victim" narrative of a difficult employee
unable to get along with coworkers that was so effective in the McKenna
case. However, the significant remedial limitations for the employeeplaintiff and admission of liability for the employer-defendant that
attend the mixed motive proof structure render it a much less attractive
option for both sides. Unfortunately, the Love-Lane case illustrates that
recent applications of the classic McDonnell-Douglas framework have
done little more than accept the employer's assertion of the plaintiff's
uncollegiality at face value.
B.

HarassmentClaims

The cases discussed below involve hostile environment harassment
claims. The standard for these claims is whether the hostile or harassing
incidents were "pervasive or severe" enough to fundamentally alter56
conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.
Despite the "pervasive or severe" standard, these cases invoke the
collegiality rationale by importing a shadow McDonnell-Douglas
structure. This structure seems to credit the employer's "legitimate, nondiscriminatory" rationale for an adverse action to explain why the
plaintiff's case falls short of the "pervasive or severe" standard.57
1.

Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.:58 "Trouble Getting Along with CoWorkers, Including Women"

In Hicks, an African American female security guard sued her
employer alleging racial and sexual harassment. When Hicks was hired
"' Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); see supra text accompanying note
17.
57 See, e.g., Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co. (Hicks II), 928 F.2d 966, 972 (10th Cir. 1991). In
upholding as "not clearly erroneous," the district court's determination that plaintiff Hicks
had failed to present proof of evidence of racial and sexual harassment adequate to support
a finding of actionable hostile environment harassment, the Tenth Circuit also discussed
rather gratuitously for a hostile environment claim, the "evidence in the record that Hicks
was discharged for poor performance," including her "trouble getting along with coworkers." Id. The poor performance evidence, certainly relevant to an individual disparate
treatment claim as the employer's LNR, seems rather curious inserted in Hicks II as though
to buttress the Tenth Circuit's questionable upholding of the district court's non-finding of
sexual harassment.
5
Hicks II, 928 F.2d at 966; Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co. (Hicks 1), 833 F.2d. 1406 (10th Cir.
1987).
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at Gates Rubber in 1980 as a security guard, she was the only African
American woman on the security force, and one of only two Black
guards. In her complaint to the EEOC, Hicks stated that her workplace
was hostile and that, "[t]he non-Black guards complain about me to one
another, make unnecessary comments to one another and to my
supervisor about me."59 In addition, Hicks alleged that her supervisor
named Gleason "patted me on the buttox [sic]" and told her that "he
would put his foot up my ass so far that I would have to go to [the] clinic
to take it out." 6 Once, when she was sitting down, Hicks testified that
Gleason said "I caught you," or "Igot you," and then "proceeded to grab
her breasts and get on top of her as she fell over."6 He also talked of
"lazy Mexicans and n***ers" in one incident, and also referred to African
Americans as "n***ers" and "coons. " 2 Another guard also harassed
Hicks, referring to her specifically as "Buffalo Butt." ' Shortly after filing
her charge with the EEOC, Hicks began to receive disciplinary warnings
and suspensions, culminating in termination.
At trial, the federal district court for the District of Colorado rejected
all of the plaintiff's claims of racial and sexual harassment. The Tenth
Circuit upheld rejection of the plaintiff's racial harassment and quid pro
quo sexual harassment claims, but reversed and remanded her hostile
environment claim.'M On remand, the district court found for the
employer again and Hicks appealed, arguing that the district court failed
to apply the remand mandate set forth by the appellate court to review
her case. 6
The Tenth Circuit once again affirmed judgment for the employer in
"Hicks II," conceding that while her supervisor's actions and statements
were "boorish," 66 there was also evidence that her termination was due
to poor job performance.67 According to the employer, Hicks was a poor
worker who "had trouble getting along with co-workers, including
women."' The Tenth Circuit in Hicks I specifically directed the lower
court on remand to aggregate the incidents of racial harassment and

Hicks II, 928 F.2d at 967.
°Id.
61 id.
62 id.
6

id.
Hicks I, 833 F.2d. at 1414, 1416-17, 1419.
63 Hicks II, 928 F.2d. at 968.
63

SId.
17

Id.at 972.

f Id.
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sexual harassment claims to ascertain whether a hostile work
environment had been established by Hicks.6 However, the appellate
court in Hicks II seemed to overlook Hicks' intersectionality by
emphasizing evidence of an African American female's alleged inability to
get along with her white female colleague. On remand, the district court
ultimately concluded that the supervisor's and co-workers' comments
were insufficiently hostile and represented little more than "a few
isolated incidents of racial enmity." 7
Thus, not only did the district court fail to recognize incidents of racial
harassment as part of a larger sexual harassment claim, thereby
acknowledging Hicks' "intersectionality," but the appellate court also
adopted a disaggregated subject - i.e., divorcing Hicks' gender identity
from her racial one - when it penalized Hicks for not getting along with
fellow co-workers, "including women." From a critical race feminist
perspective, it was inconsequential that some of the racial epithets were
uttered by white women in Hicks' case. At the original trial, Gates'
employees testified that the work environment was one in which "racial
slurs and jokes were tolerated." 71 Thus, the female identity of her coworkers did not undermine her claims of racial hostility, or for that
matter, what I'd refer to as "racialized sexual harassment" or sexual
Again, the court
harassment that has a racial content or context.7
uncritically applied the construct of collegiality from the perspective of
the harasser to effectively silence a plaintiff resisting such harassment. 3
Hicks I,833 F.2d at 1416-17.
7oHicks II, 928 F.2d at 972-73.
71Hicks L 928 F.2d. at 1409.

See generally Sumi Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where
the Model Minority Meets Suzie Wong, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177 (1997) (arguing that
women of color are subjected to unique workplace hazard of "racialized sexual
harassment" due to complex of raced and gendered subject positions and power relations
of harassers and victims); Kimber6 Crenshaw, Race, Gender & Sexual Harassment,65 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1467 (1992) (discussing dual vulnerability of African American women to sexual
harassment due to intersection of dynamics of race and gender); Tanya Kateri Hernindez,
Sexual Harassment and Racial Disparity: The Mutual Construction of Gender and Race, 4 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 183 (2001) (reporting research findings of racial disparity in sexual
harassment cases in EEOC charge filings and federal court from 1992 to 1999, suggesting
that harassers target women of color at higher rate than white women).
See also Ramsey v. City and County of Denver, 907 F.2d 1004, 1011 (10th Cir. 1990)
(affirming district court finding for employer on basis that "plaintiff's personality was the
primary force behind her failure to advance with the City"). In Ramsey, the appellate court
acknowledged that Ramsey's supervisor was "widely known to have ideas about women's
place in the workforce" and had testified that women are "better suited to some jobs than
to others." Id. at 1008. Nevertheless, the appellate court concluded that the female
employee had failed to establish a primafacie sexual harassment case since "any change in
her working conditions or terms of her employment was her own fault." Id. at 1006. The
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Landgraf v. USI Film Products4

2.

In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, female employee Barbara Landgraf
resigned after filing a sexual harassment complaint at her production
plant. She complained of "continuous and repeated inappropriate verbal
comments and physical contact" by a co-worker, John Williams, who
also served as union steward.7' Landgraf's immediate supervisor took
no action despite her repeated complaints. Williams was investigated
only after Landgraf complained to the company's personnel manager.
Following a formal investigation in which four other women
corroborated Landgraf's harassment claims of inappropriate touching
and verbal comments, the offending supervisor was "technically
transferred to another department" although USI officials admitted that
he would still regularly visit Landgraf's work area.76 The transfer was
not a form of company discipline.
Williams was not otherwise
disciplined, despite written policies listing sexual harassment as an
offense "requiring suspension or dismissal."'
Following her complaint and the company investigation, at least two
of Landgraf's superiors took her aside to notify her that her complaint
had been acted upon, but without disclosing the actions taken against
her harasser. They further informed her that she was "among [her] own
worst enemies" and that she was "very unpopular." During the course
of the company's investigation of the incidents, officials inquired not
only about the alleged harasser's behavior, but also about Landgraf's
relationships with other employees. Two shifts later, Landgraf resigned,
addressing a letter to her colleagues stating that "the stress that each one
of you help [sic] put on me, caused me to leave my job."'
Landgraf brought harassment and retaliation claims against USI. The
district court found that the employer took reasonable steps to end the
harassment, and that evidence did not support the employee's claim of
constructive discharge or retaliation. Upon review, the Fifth Circuit
agreed with the district court's dismissal of the retaliation claim for lack
of adverse employment action. The district court determined as a factual

Tenth Circuit noted reports that Ramsey "was difficult to work for" because she was "overdemanding and overbearing" with one employee (whom she complained was an "overt
sexist"). Id. at 1009-10.
7 Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 429.
76id.

Id.
78id.

n Id.

20061

"Unwise," "Untimely," and "Extreme"

matter (and the Fifth Circuit upheld as not clearly erroneous), that the
plaintiff resigned her job because of her "trouble getting along with her
co-workers," and not because of the harassment.'
What seems perplexing here is the courts' utter inability to imagine
how the plaintiff might have resigned for both reasons, and that not
getting along with co-workers was a byproduct of the original
harassment. It is also startling under these facts, how the district court
was unable to connect the dots when it appears that management played
a role in creating plaintiff's "trouble getting along with her co-workers."
Despite Landgraf's arguments that her troubles with co-workers
stemmed from Williams' harassment, the appellate court upheld the
district court's contrary finding.
Three problems with employers' "collegiality rationale" emerge from
these cases ranging from circumstantial disparate treatment to hostile
environment harassment and retaliation cases under Title VII. First,
courts have no mechanism or mode of analysis to ferret out whether the
"personality conflict," "uncollegiality" or "not getting along with others"
has merit or whether it is merely pretext for discrimination complained
about by the plaintiff. Second, in the absence of any method of
distinguishing between meritorious and pretextual assertions, courts
seem to be "double crediting" an employer's "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" not only at the second stage of the traditional
McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting structure, but also at the pretext
stage where mere articulation of the collegiality trump card serves to
undo any pretextual showing of the plaintiff. In harassment cases, courts
seem to be invoking the collegiality rationale inappropriately as an
employer LNR to further buttress a non-finding of hostile environment
under a "pervasive or severe" analysis. Finally, courts seem to lose sight
of complex workplace dynamics involving power and discrimination
and its effects on workplace culture. As such, courts seem to adopt an
entirely too simplistic "either/or" approach to the she said
discrimination/he said uncollegiality paradox. Rather than assuming
that it's either discrimination or uncollegiality, courts should consider
that it might be both, and that plaintiffs are viewed by co-workers as
uncollegial because they have been discriminated against. Moreover, if
unpopularity or uncollegiality is largely a byproduct of discrimination,
then courts should not credit such rationales as "legitimate and
nondiscriminatory."

'o Id. at 431.
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In light of the legal doctrine of hegemonic collegiality discussed above,
I will now consider the legal scholarship on the topic for the purpose of
developing doctrinal reforms and cultural strategies to contain the
operation of the "collegiality trump card" in the workplace and in the
courts. It should be noted that the cases discussed above are drawn from
a wide range of employment contexts. However, what little legal
scholarship exists on collegiality hails from a much narrower range of
employment discrimination cases - primarily in academia.
II.

EXISTING APPROACHES TO ANALYZING THE "COLLEGIALITY
RATIONALE" IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES

Despite the social and legal significance of collegiality or "getting
along" with others as a performance-based consideration for
employment, there has been relatively little written on the topic. The
most coverage in legal scholarship has focused upon the application of
collegiality in the field of academic employment. Unfortunately, there is
far less consideration in the literature about the "getting along" aspect in
other workplace contexts, especially in working-class or other
professional class jobs outside of academia. Although the discussion of
the legal literature on collegiality in this Part focuses on academic
employment, I will propose more exacting tests for courts to apply when
scrutinizing an employer's "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason." In
Part III, I will discuss how these tests apply to workplaces beyond
academic institutions.
A.

The Emergence of "Collegiality" as a Legally-Recognized Factor

The actual term, "collegiality," first emerged in a 1981 Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision involving a university tenure denial case,
Mayberry v. Dees."' In Mayberry, Assistant Professor Mayberry was
denied tenure despite five previous, uniformly favorable annual
evaluations. 2 He sued, alleging that his tenure denial was due to
retaliation against him for criticizing the chair of his department in the
exercise of his First Amendment rights of free expression.'
At trial, Professor Mayberry prevailed before a jury on both the First
Amendment and breach of contract claims, winning compensatory and

"Mayberry v. Dees, 663 F.2d 502, 514 (1981).
8 Id. at 512; see also Perry A. Zirkel, Mayberry v. Dees: Collegiality as a Criterion for
Faculty Tenure, 12 ED. LAW REP. 1053, 1053 (1983).
Mayberry, 663 F.2d at 504.
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punitive damages.' The trial judge awarded five years back pay but no
reinstatement. On appeal, a panel of the Fourth Circuit initially upheld
the jury verdict, but reversed the trial judge's award of remedies.85 In an
unusual case history, another reconstituted panel of the Fourth Circuit
then decided to rehear the case, and ultimately reversed the findings of
liability by the jury and first Fourth Circuit panel, determining that
Mayberry had not established his First Amendment claims.'
Collegiality became a significant consideration to rebut Mayberry's
claim of discrimination. To counteract the five positive reviews and five
contract renewals he had received up to his tenure denial, the Fourth
Circuit determined that tenure involves far more than the "mere passage
of time in service. ", 7 It also included plaintiff demonstrating a
"developed collegiality."'4 The court proceeded to define collegiality as
"the capacity to relate well and constructively to the comparatively8 small
9
bank of scholars on whom the ultimate fate of the university rests."
1.

Early Critics of Collegiality: From Professor Zirkel to Dyer

Following the Mayberry v. Dees case, the topic of collegiality barely
registered in legal scholarship. Professor Perry Zirkel was one of the
first and only legal scholars to publish significantly on the topic of
collegiality in the first two decades following the 1981 case.9 Professor
Zirkel warned of the use of collegiality as subterfuge in academic
employment decisions that would negatively impact the meaning and
operation of "the robust exchange of ideas" at institutions of higher
education. 9
In a follow-up article entitled, Personality as a Criterion for Faculty
Tenure: The Enemy It Is Us,92 Professor Zirkel elaborated his critique of

" See Zirkel, Mayberry v. Dees, supra note 82, at 1054. As Professor Zirkel reported
soon after the appellate cases, the trial court decision was not reported and was only
referred to "peripherally" in the reported Fourth Circuit opinion of the reconstituted panel.
The original Fourth Circuit panel opinion that contained a more detailed account of the
trial court's decision in Mayberry was subsequently withdrawn.
Id. at 1055.
Mayberry, 663 F.2d at 505.
87Id. at 514.
88
Id.
89

Id.
o Zirkel, Mayberry v. Dees, supra note 82, at 1059 (warning that Mayberry v. Dees
"would seem to encourage the uncritical use of collegiality as overt or even covert criterion
for faculty tenure decisions").
9

1 d.

82

Perry A. Zirkel, Personality as a Criterion for Faculty Tenure: The Enemy It Is Us, 33
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Mayberry v. Dees. He called for a more exacting judicial review of cases
in which institutions of higher education base negative employment
actions upon collegiality or other seemingly personality-based criteria.93
Noting that the judicial deference granted to academic institutions
historically was for the purpose of promoting academic freedom, Zirkel
argued that the standard for review involving cases claiming
infringement of individual academic freedom should be less deferential.
Rather, Zirkel reasoned that "an approach that pierces the veil of
institutional autonomy when there is a threat to individual autonomy is
necessary."9" In other words, where a university or college interferes
with the robust exchange of ideas, it foregoes the judicial deference
granted to preserve the free flow of ideas.9 To arrive at this conclusion,
Professor Zirkel reviewed a variety of alarming examples of faculty
behaviors - namely "[s]upport for teacher organizations, Marxist
philosophy, or other 'non-Establishment' causes" that are deemed
in
96
case law to fall outside of the acceptable limits of "collegiality."
Expanding upon Professor Zirkel's reforms, Professor Edgar Dyer
proposes a new standard for the use of collegiality in cases involving
claims of freedom of speech in public higher education.97 Dyer's
objective is to provide "the utmost protection to the spoken, written, or
artistic expressions of an academician" who is speaking as an
9
academician.
" Where academic faculty are speaking within their field of
expertise to advance truth-seeking, Professor Dyer advocates for
abandoning the Pickering-Connickbalancing test" traditionally applied in
such cases to weigh appropriately the plaintiff's interest in academic
freedom against the employer-defendant's interest in a non-disruptive,
efficient workplace." Referring to a balancing of interests as "absurd" in
these circumstances, he suggests that if the speech is purely academic,

CLEV. ST. L. REv. 223 (1984-85).
93Id. at 237-43.
Id. at 238.
I1d.
Id. at 235.
"Edgar Dyer, Collegiality's PotentialChill over Faculty Speech: Demonstrating the Need for
a Refined Version of Pickering and Connickfor Public Higher Education, 119 EDUc. L. REP. 309,
319-22 (1997).
98 Id. at 319-20.
"In this balancing test, a public employee's comments about a matter of public concern
are protected speech. The determination of whether employee speech constitutes a public
concern is made by the "content, form, and context of a given statement." Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
'w Dyer, supra note 97, at 321.
9
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then no balancing should be able to remove such expression from
protection."' The touchstone to determining whether expressions fall
within the "truth-seeking" exception is "intellectual honesty."'0 2
Interestingly, Professor Dyer serves as University Counsel for Coastal
Carolina University in South Carolina, and contrary to his university
official peers, is the only one to advocate for stronger protections for
faculty expressions in the face of charges of uncollegial behavior.
Perhaps heeding Zirkel's and Dyer's early warnings, the American
Association of University Professors (AAUP) adopted a position in 1999
advocating against the increasing use of collegiality as a separate
criterion for the evaluation of faculty members, a development the
AAUP characterized as "highly unfortunate. " 1 3 The AAUP elaborated
the dangers of such a standard that has been associated with promoting
conformity and homogeneity, "and hence with practices that exclude
persons on the basis of their difference from a perceived norm. " "°4 While
not denying the importance of collegiality generally to academic life, the
AAUP concluded that the "very real potential for a distinct criterion of
'collegiality' to cast a pall of stale uniformity places it in direct tension
with the value of faculty diversity in all its contemporary
manifestations." Certainly, the association argued, a university "replete
with genial Babbitts" is not the place for a society "to look for
leadership." 05 The AAUP further argues against collegiality as a
separate criterion of evaluation due to its threat to academic freedom
and its potential for "chilling faculty debate and discussion.""
The early critics of the use of collegiality in academic decision making
primarily raise First Amendment or freedom of expression concerns."
While they tend to acknowledge the possibility of worksites that
promote conformity and homogeneity, most conceive of the university
as a "free marketplace of ideas" utopia to be preserved through careful
limitation of the collegiality norm.
Far less attention is paid to the

,' Id.
2
" Id. at 320.

'0'
AM.

ASS'N OF U.

PROFESSORS, ON COLLEGIALITY

AS A CRITERION

FOR FACULTY

EVALUATION (1999), available at http: //www.aaup.org/statements/Redbook/collegia.htm
[hereinafter AAUP STATEMENT].
0

id.

105 Id.

Id.
"7See supra notes 108-23 and accompanying text.
106

'" See, e.g., Dyer, supra note 97, at 320 (asserting that "[tihe truth is best gleaned from
fallacy in a 'marketplace of ideas,' which requires the freedom to express propositions or
theories without fear of any form of reprisal" (citation omitted)); Zirkel, supra note 92, at
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problem of deploying collegiality as a cover for employment
discrimination, and no scholar seriously considers that the workplace
routinely may be a hostile, unequal site for members of outsider groups.
Thus, the emphasis for reform revolves around preserving "individual
autonomy " "°9 or protecting the occasional "gadfly."...
It is very possible that this high-profile, influential statement by the
AAUP adopted at the very end of the 20th century (along with some
celebrated media cases involving tenure denial on the grounds of
uncollegiality) prompted the renewed interest in the topic of collegiality
in the first five years of the 21st century, two decades after Mayberry v.
Dees.
B.

Recent Proponentsof Collegiality

For the most part, more recent articles assess the treatment of the topic
by the courts, observing the main legal challenges to using collegiality as
a criterion."' These legal challenges involve primarily breach of contract
claims and academic freedom or free speech concerns."2 While most
commentators acknowledge the potential abuse of such a standard, they
nonetheless uphold the importance of collegiality to the workplace, and
merely work to propose reforms to make collegiality work more fairly.
In this second generation of legal scholarship, most commentators are
proponents of collegiality as a factor in employment. In part, this
orientation may be attributable to the authors' positionality within
academic institutions, with most writing favorably about collegiality
having held positions of authority in the academic hierarchy - either as
general counsel to a university, or as upper-level administrators. It
makes sense that those charged with running a university on a day-today basis would most see the need for a cooperative ethic and spirit
among the faculty, and be less critical overall of its potential abuses.
Moreover, the strong AAUP stand, critical of the use of collegiality as a
separate factor in the evaluation of faculty, may have prompted
defenders of collegiality to reply at a higher rate than its critics.

243 (closing commentary with cite from Gray v. Board of Higher Education, 692 F.2d 901, 909
(2d Cir. 1982): "[The university] campus [is] a forum whose chief and high purpose is the
robust exchange of ideas .... But academic freedom is illusory when it does not protect
faculty from censorious practices but rather serves as a veil for those who might act as
censors. "(citation omitted)).
'" Zirkel, supra note 92, at 238.
"0AAUP STATEMENT, supra note 103.
"' See discussion infra Part II.B.
2see id.
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1.

Connell and Savage: Defending University Use of Collegiality
Standards

In their 2001 article entitled, The Role of Collegiality in Higher Education
Tenure, Promotion, and Termination Decisions, Mary Ann Connell and
Frederick G. Savage review the state of the law regarding the
consideration of collegiality in academic employment decisions. They
review the arguments for and against the consideration of collegiality,
and analyze how such arguments have fared in academic employment
discrimination claims.
On the "pro" side, Connell and Savage
summarize that the three main arguments deployed involve the
institutional interest in cooperative, collaborative behavior; the
reasonableness of such an expectation of collegiality that is without
question in the "business world" and therefore should apply to the
academy; and that the courts have overwhelmingly supported the
consideration of collegiality.
The authors then detail the criticisms of collegiality, detailing the three
main arguments used in court to contest the application of collegiality as
a decision making factor in employment. According to Connell and
Savage, the three main arguments against collegiality are: 1) its use
constitutes a breach of contract; 2) its use reflects an employer's pretext for
discrimination; and 3) its use violates academic freedom or freedom of
speech. Although Connell and Savage appear to be simply reviewing
the pros and cons of collegiality according to its supporters and critics in
a "just-the-facts, ma'am" sort of way, they conclude that courts have
upheld "at every turn" the deployment of the collegiality rationale in key
employment decisions involving faculty., "usually because of the
recognition that collegiality is an important factor in the ability of
5 4
colleges and universities to fulfill their missions.""
Ultimately, Connell and Savage provide their punch line in the
article's last sentence: "Given the weight of the decisions by the courts on
the issue of collegiality, the authors have concluded that institutions of
higher learning should feel confident in considering collegiality in
faculty decisions and that it is unnecessary for them to specify
collegiality as a separate and distinct criterion."" 5 The neutral stance
gives way to that of the university attorney counseling her client: "[Go
ahead and do what you want, because the courts are with you." While I
do not find fault with the accuracy of Connell and Savage's assessments
113Connell

& Savage, supra note 10.

..Id. at 858.
115Id.
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of the law, I do not find their proposal to continue the status quo as a
helpful contribution to challenging the hegemonic definition of
collegiality.
2.

Former Associate Dean Seigel: Uncollegiality as Individual
Psychoses

Three major law review articles on collegiality appear in 2004, with all
three authors favoring the continued use of collegiality in [academic]
employment decisions."'
Professor Michael Seigel, provides the
strongest defense of collegiality of the three, starting by acknowledging
the subjective nature of collegiality and offering his definitions of
"baseline (or passive) collegiality,"" 7 "affirmative collegiality,"" 8 and
"affirmative uncollegiality."' 19 After providing these categorizations of
collegiality, Professor Seigel then engages a cost-benefit analysis of the
enforcement of the norm of collegiality as a criterion in academic
employment. Here, Professor Seigel is able to draw upon his two years
experience as Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at the University of
Florida, Levin College of Law, to analyze the benefits of collegialitybased decision making - i.e., providing positive role models for
students, retaining and attracting quality faculty, and developing and
maintaining a supportive and rewarding workplace environment. In
terms of costs, Professor Seigel readily acknowledges the potential
pitfalls of the collegiality norm as a subterfuge for illegal
discrimination,' 2 as well as the potential tension between the

116

Gregory M. Heiser, "Because the Stakes Are So Small":

Collegiality, Polemic, and

Professionalism in Academic Employment Decisions, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 385, 420, 427 (2004)
(redefining and endorsing collegiality as professionals of equal status taking responsibility
for their organization's governance); Leonard Pertnoy, The "C" Word: Collegiality Real or
Imaginary, and Should It Matter in a Tenure Process, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 201, 223 (2004)
(arguing that collegiality is "necessity" that "needs to be taken out of obscurity and added
into a rigid list" of criteria for evaluation of professors); Michael L. Seigel, On Collegiality,54
J. LEGAL EDUC. 406, 440 (2004) (concluding that "[f]ailure to maintain collegiality is
potentially costly to morale and productivity of an institution").
"' Professor Seigel defines baseline collegiality as "conducting oneself in a manner that
does not impinge upon the ability of one's colleagues to do their jobs or on the capacity of
one's institution to fulfill its mission." Seigel, supra note 116, at 411.
,,8
In addition to doing their job "exceptionally well," affirmatively collegial faculty also
"typically go beyond the call of duty in some aspect(s) of their job." Id. at 414.
.. According to Seigel, affirmative uncollegiality is the mirror opposite of baseline
collegiality - i.e., "conduct that interferes with the ability of one's colleagues to do their
jobs or with the capacity of one's institution to fulfill its mission." Id. at 415.
' Id. at 426.
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enforcement of collegiality and academic freedom.2 '
After reviewing the benefits and costs of enforcing a collegiality norm
in the workplace, Professor Seigel concludes that the AAUP position of
"eschewing enforcement altogether" is unwarranted and ill-advised as it
rewards the few very aggressive "bad actors" on a faculty. He attempts
to "strike a balance" by advocating for a "baseline collegiality"
requirement for faculty as part of an adopted set of internal guidelines.
At the same time faculties adopt this "baseline collegiality" standard, he
simultaneously favors "guarding vigilantly against its use to silence or
impede the unusual, unpopular, or unorthodox.""
Professor Seigel then discusses methods to achieve such a delicate
balance in the next thirteen pages of the article. But of those thirteen
pages, only one page is devoted to policing against potential violations
of academic freedom or discrimination."
The remaining twelve of
thirteen pages go to policing against potential uncollegial behaviors,
complete with psychological profiles of uncollegial faculty - from
"Hostile Aggressives," 124 ("HA"s) to "Sarcastic Wits,""' ("SW"s) and
"Borderline Personality Disorder" 1 6 ("BPD"s). Thus, even though the
"balancing" of costs and benefits are discussed, the sheer "unbalance" in
the text tipping towards enforcement mechanisms for collegiality seem
to reveal the true emphasis of Professor Seigel's concern. For Professor
Seigel, the collegiality problem is largely rooted in the individual
psyches and personality disorders of faculty members: "The problem of
collegiality in academia is like a crazy aunt in the family: ever1 27present,
whispered about in hallways, but rarely acknowledged directly.
3.

Assistant Provost Heiser: Collegiality Among Independent
Professional Equals - A Sociological vs.
"Overconstitutionalized" Approach

Perhaps the most challenging and troubling of the trio of 2004 law
review articles on collegiality is that of Professor Gregory Heiser. In
Heiser's article, "Because the Stakes Are So Small": Collegiality, Polemic, and
Professionalism in Academic Employment Decisions, he rejects an

...
Id. at 424.
Id. at 427.
' Id. at 428.
12 Id. at 434-35.
Id. at 435-36.
,26
Id. at 436.
"

Id.
at 440.
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individualized or psychological treatment of collegiality that Professor
Seigel seems to indulge." Instead, Professor Heiser adopts a sociological
definition of collegiality that conceptualizes it as a structural quality of
organizations, or more specifically, "as a defining element of selfgoverning professional organizations."129 Contrasted with bureaucracies
marked by strict hierarchies, Professor Heiser argues that "[c]ollegiality
matters most among independent professional equals, least among
subordinate Employees in a bureaucracy."'
Professional, collegial
organizations, such as medical associations, university faculty, and law
firms, differ from bureaucratic ones insofar as the former are comprised
of a body of highly trained and autonomous experts who are "theoretical
equals" in their levels of specialized expertise."'
While these
professionals are highly autonomous, they are not self-contained. Thus,
Heiser argues that collegiality as a value is empirically different in
professional settings versus bureaucratic ones. In professional settings,
collegiality is important to foster. This includes collaboration among
equals in a non-hierarchical organization to further its goals.132 In
contrast, hierarchical bureaucracies further their goals by relying upon
the exercise of authority by superiors, punishing
insubordination or
133
subordinates, and incentivizing production.
Understood in this more structural context, Professor Heiser proceeds
to critique the treatment of collegiality in employment cases by the
courts. He takes particular aim at the application of the Pickering-Connick
balancing test to weigh a plaintiff's academic freedom claims against the
public employer-defendant's stated concern of collegiality."M Here,
Heiser advocates, the "overconstitutionalized" First Amendment
approach to Pickering-Connick. He argues that courts should cede to the
insights of sociologists by taking proper account of the role of collegiality
in professional settings. The two-part balancing test first inquires
whether the subject matter is one of "public concern" that is afforded
protection. If so, then the second part of the test asks whether the
expression in question disrupted the efficient operation of the workplace.

lm Heiser, supra note 116, at 387 (suggesting that collegiality not be considered
"personality trait of individuals" but as possessing structural quality as social scientists
conceive of it).
129
id.

"0Id. at 388.
31Id. at 408.
132Id. at 412.
133id.

"'Id. at 399-405.
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Professor Heiser seeks to intervene on both prongs of the test, first by
expanding the notion of "public concern" to consider the significance of
professional academic decisions regarding disciplinary matters; and
second, by expanding the employer's interest in efficiency include
"unfettered but civil academic discourse" in college or university
settings.
Much of Professor
Heiser's criticisms
of the
overconstitutionalized approach stem from the insights gleaned from
sociological studies of professional organizations marked by the high
degree of autonomy and specialization shared by individual and equal
members of the collective workplace. But it is important to note that the
assumption of equality among the members is exactly
what is non13
discrimination.
employment
involving
cases
in
existent
In addition to his criticisms of the Pickering-Connick test as applied to
the First Amendment/collegiality opposition, Professor Heiser also
advocates for continued judicial deference to academic decisionmaking"3 on the grounds that such decisions represent the exercise of
professional discretion as opposed to "standardless personal prejudices
or an inherently suspect imposition of uniformity." However, this
contention begs the question: how does one know when "professional
discretion" vs. "personal prejudice" is being exercised? While Heiser is
quick to embrace sociological approaches to understanding the
structural quality of collegiality in the professions, he fails to
acknowledge sociological approaches to understanding the cleavages of
race, class, gender, and sexuality in the workplace that give rise to
pretextual reliance upon "collegiality" as a criterion for adverse
employment actions.
The continued judicial deference towards
academic institutions on questions of collegiality that Professor Heiser
advocates may be in part understood through Heiser's position within
the structure of the professional organization of which he is a part. As
Assistant Provost at the University of Oklahoma, Heiser, like Connell
and Savage and Seigel may be more accustomed to understanding the
benefits versus the pitfalls of the operation of the collegial norm, and
identify more closely with the university-defendant when shaping legal
reforms.

' See discussion infra Part I (providing examples of cases lacking this assumption of
equality).
"
Professor Heiser acknowledges that collegiality cases may not deserve the full
measure of judicial deference afforded to "academic judgments." However, he still
advocates for a presumption that such deployments involve the exercise of professional
discretion and not personal prejudices. Heiser, supra note 116, at 427.
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Professor Pertnoy: A Call for "Objective Collegiality"

The third in the trio of articles to appear in 2004 issues a general
critique of the vague, subjective nature of the term collegiality, and
reviews the possible dangers of its application as an employment
criterion. Like Connell and Savage, Professor Pertnoy covers the three
most common concerns about collegiality's use - as "cover-up" for
discriminatory pretext, as stifling of academic freedom, and as breach of
contract. At bottom, however, he aims to add collegiality as a separate
criterion and as a "common sense" measure for academic employment:
"Would you work for the rest of your career with others that are
uncivilized and lack a positive demeanor?"
Pertnoy's proposal
primarily advocates for greater "objectiveness" and for adding
collegiality as a fourth factor to be considered in academic employment
(contrary to the AAUP position).1 37 "By clearly defining the term and
explicitly applying and including it in the tenure evaluation, it is possible
to make it as objective as humanly possible.""' For critical theorists, the
call towards "objectiveness" appears at best, naive, as does Pertnoy's
dismissal of the dangers of collegiality serving as pretext for
discrimination based upon his belief that discrimination "can be
controlled by well established criteria."' 39
The major law review articles on collegiality to emerge in the 21t
century are careful to acknowledge the potential dangers of the use of
collegiality as pretext for discrimination or threat to academic freedom as
unusual exceptions to the truth-seeking university. Ultimately, however,
each scholar advocating for collegiality works to further entrench the use
of hegemonic collegiality by courts, which includes maintenance of
historic deference to academic institutions by crediting the face-value
importance of collegiality and the existence of its breach. The workplace
is understood to be mostly a functioning and fair place to these authors,
one for which the benefits of collegiality clearly outweigh its costs. Four
of the five authors advocating in favor of collegiality as an employment
criterion represent university interests as either general counsels or
upper-level administrators. Certainly, it is legitimate for those officials
who have had extensive experience with the benefits and pitfalls of
university standards employing collegiality as an evaluative criterion.
However, my larger point is one of power and context in defining how
courts should analyze claims of uncollegiality by employers. It is my
137

Pertnoy, supra note 116, at 222.

1 Id.
'2 Id. at 217.
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aim to reject hegemonic collegiality and to attempt to define a more
transformative model of collegiality that can be operationalized by
courts and co-workers on the job in a range of employment contexts.
III.

TOWARDS A CONCEPTUALIZATION OF "TRANSFORMATIVE
COLLEGIALITY"

A more enlightened definition of collegiality must recognize power
imbalances and oppressive cultures in the workplace. In essence, I
advocate for a "transformative collegiality" that would be supportive of
challenges to unequal power exercised in the workplace along the major
fault lines of race, gender, sexuality, class, disability, etc. Absent such
legal and cultural transformations, hegemonic collegiality will
continually be deployed to dismantle employment discrimination claims
and to foster a form of outsider-based "censorship." Absent reforms,

courts will continue to impose externally a default hegemonic
collegiality by accepting uncritically at face value, the employerdefendant's collegiality-based rebuttal of the allegation of discrimination
and granting undue judicial deference to an employer's decision making.
Thus, workplace cultures will continue to reproduce the status quo
internally through the norms and expectations of hegemonic collegiality

itself.
If one takes seriously the writings of critical scholars in law, the extant
literature on collegiality falls far short of redressing structural and
cultural barriers to equality, and fails to account for the ways in which
workplace identities are shaped and performed in recognition of
structural barriers, including raced and gendered stereotypes.14 In
contrast to such scholars as those discussed above, the work of
Professors Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati on Working Identity is most
helpful to illuminate the problems of hegemonic approaches to the
collegiality conundrum.
In Working Identity, Carbado and Gulati surface a form of employment
discrimination that lies far below the radar - i.e., the unwritten job
description for outsider employees who must perform their identities to
the satisfaction and/or comfort of their insider-colleagues and

"'

See discussion infra Part II.
See generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV.

1259, 1277-78 (2000) (providing particularly insightful passage about no-win conundrum
facing employees of color in navigating between charges of uncollegiality and confirmation
of negative racial stereotypes).
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superiors.'
Unlike the collegiality commentators reviewed above,
Professors Carbado and Gulati's starting assumption for the workplace
is a site in which widespread stereotyping of outsider groups is the
norm, not the exception.'43 As such, Carbado and Gulati analyze that an
outsider attempting to fulfill expectations around institutional values,
such as collegiality, faces a "sliding scale" of interpretation based upon
the dominant positive or negative stereotypes about one's particular
identity coordinates.1 " In other words, the words and actions of the
outsider are filtered through the interpretive lens of the dominant
cultural insider, an interpretive lens not immune from widespread
societal stereotypes. Layered on top of this challenge for outsider
employees, is the additional irony of working in a post civil rights era in
which colorblindness is the default racial ideal in the workplace.
Although there are actual expectations about how a "typical" or
"normal" (i.e., stereotypical) African American male or Asian American
female should or would act at the workplace, these expectations are
never surfaced openly.
Thus, the identity performance strategies
selected by outsider employees are all the more perplexing as well as
hazardous."
What is so important about the work of Carbado and Gulati for this
topic, is that it reveals how culturally-contingent and power-sensitive the
definition of workplace values such as collegiality are, according to one's
race and gender among other identity characteristics.
Failure to
recognize this contingency in the understanding of collegiality results in
the problematic mode of utilizing a hegemonic collegiality, which
essentially says, "collegial is as the dominant, discriminating group says
it is." In the sections below, I will propose some doctrinal and cultural
strategies to help courts and workers apply a more contextually
appropriate transformative collegiality that valorizes workplace
equalization and positive cultural change.
A. Doctrinal Reframings: Shifting the Burden in Unequal Environments
If one considers as a starting point, the definitional hallmark of
collegiality, the equal vesting of power and authority among each of a

1

13

Id. at 1262-70.
Id. at 1279 (providing but one example of this differing starting assumption, authors

state rather matter-of-factly that, "[plerforming identity consumes resources in the form of
time and effort, which is one of the costs of discrimination.").
Id. at 1267-70.
"'Id. at 1285-88.
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number of colleagues,/
one may reconsider existing doctrine
surrounding judicial deference to the employer rebuttal of "collegiality."
Specifically, where the workplace is unequal among colleagues,
particularly for reasons prohibited by antidiscrimination laws, then the
proper work of collegiality is to bring about a state of equality. If one
takes such equalization work seriously, one understands that progress
will not be made without conflict and tension, particularly for those
viewed as "pushing the envelope" of change. Thus, courts should
subject the employer's rationale that the employee did not "get along
with others," was "uncivil" or "uncollegial" to a more exacting review
rather than accepting at face value, the proffered reason for negative job
action.
The current judicial approach to analyzing competing claims of
discrimination vs. uncollegiality tends to simply cycle the claims in rote
order through the McDonnell-Douglas (or mixed motive) proof
structure. 7 However, doing so treats the collegiality trump card of the
employer as though it is wholly unrelated to the underlying claim of
discrimination, harassment and/or retaliation. Given the inferential
proof structure developed for circumstantial cases of disparate treatment
employment discrimination, there is a logical fallacy that attaches to such
treatment - i.e., that the assertion of uncollegiality as the employer's
LNR for its adverse actions against the employee-plaintiff is
presumptively non-discriminatory.
Once the employer's stated
"collegiality" rationale is accepted at face value by courts as its LNR, the
primary route for the plaintiff to carry her burden of proving
discriminatory intent is to cast doubt on the veracity of the stated LNR as
the "real reason" for the challenged actions.
Thus, by establishing that the non-discriminatory reason offered is
"false" and it did not truly motivate the employer decision making, the
plaintiff may prevail before fact-finders on the pretextual showing.
However, the problem with the "uncollegiality" LNR offered by the
employer, is that it very well may be the "true" reason for the employer's
actions, and still be discriminatory. The common error inheres in the
automatic relegation of "uncollegiality," "not getting along," or
"personality conflict/disorder" being forwarded as a nondiscriminatory
reason.

This definition is consistent with the Webster's Dictionary definition. See supra note 11,
and accompanying text. It is also consistent with the sociological understanding of
collegiality summarized in Professor Heiser's work. See Heiser, supra note 116 and
accompanying text.
" See discussion infra Part I.
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Before such a generally neutral sounding reason can be accepted as
nondiscriminatory, courts should adopt more searching inquiries to
prevent mere re-articulation of discrimination as the plaintiff's
personality disorder or lack of social skills or judgment. Foregoing this
inquiry means that plaintiffs will be subjected to a "popularity contest"
for their claims, often in a hostile environment in which their jury may
also be the perpetrators, or in the alternative, co-workers under the vise
of hegemonic collegiality who prefer not to confront or contradict those
in power. As an analogy, foregoing a more searching inquiry might be
equivalent to allowing harassers to define whether their harassing
behavior was welcome, pervasive, or severe.
B.

Ten Criteriato Assess Collegiality as an Employer's Legitimate, NonDiscriminatoryReason in an Adverse Employment Action

Questions involving normative values and assessments that are
socially produced must be analyzed if not in a more "objective" fashion,
then in a way that is not completely stacked against the plaintiffemployee. The following set of ten criteria aim to assist courts in
employing a more exacting, power-sensitive inquiry into an employer's
claims that a plaintiff is "uncollegial" or "can't get along." These
questions, inspired in form by sociologist David Wellman's work for
decoding contemporary racism," reflect an approach to defining
collegiality in a transformative, as opposed to hegemonic, way.

' Professor Wellman has developed a set of nine criteria for "decoding racism" that
can also be applied more specifically to determine whether an employer's proffered LNR is
pretextual in employment discrimination cases:
1. Does fact support the employer's decision?
2. Does the employer apply standards consistently among people of different races?
3. Does an inconsistency in applying the standards favor whites over African
Americans or people who belong to other minority groups?
4. Did the employer's explanation of a decision change when the employee
challenged it?
5. Is there statistical data to support the claim of unfair treatment?
6. Did the employer abide by stated rules and standards for granting jobs and
promotions?
7. Did the employer properly consider the employee's evidence and claims?
8.Did the employer follow progressive discipline, warning the employee of
unsatisfactory performance and suggesting improvement?
9. Did the employer follow stated policies on dealing with racial inequality?
DAVID WELLMAN, PORTRAITS OF WHITE RAcISM (2d ed. 1993).
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"Same Claim" Derivativeness:
1) Do the plaintiff's claims of employment discrimination and the
employer's proffered "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" asserting a
plaintiff's uncollegiality, not getting along with others, insubordination,
lack of professionalism, etc. arise out of the same set of facts?
2) Are any of the individuals that the employee is accused of "not
getting along with" involved in the employee's discrimination
complaint?
3) Does the employer's rationale for its negative employment action
revolve solely or primarily around the collegiality standard or "getting
along with others"?
Nature, Quality & Consistency of Evidence of "Uncollegiality":
4) Does the employer have evidence of the plaintiff's uncollegial or
untoward behavior that predates the underlying facts of the plaintiff's
complaint(s)?
5) Did the employer solicit negative information about the employee's
relations with others with whom she is accused of not getting along?
Did the employer disseminate negative information about the employee
to other co-workers?
6) Have the reasons offered for negative employment action changed
throughout time? Have the reasons been proven to be false?
7) Do members of the non-protected group engage in similar actions
complained about by the offending (uncivil or uncollegial) employee
belonging to a protected group without similar sanction?
Workplace Imbalance/Equalization Efforts:
8) Is there statistical or anecdotal support for workplace inequality
based on prohibited characteristics in antidiscrimination law (i.e., race,
gender, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, etc.)?
a) Is there a disparity between the available pool of employees and
actual employees according to protected characteristics?
b) Is there a racial or gender (or other protected category) disparity
between the percentages of outsiders as employees vs. decision makers?
c) Have stereotypes about protected groups in question manifested in
the workplace?
9) Has the plaintiff attempted to bring about greater equality in the
workplace for a protected group, whether at the level of hiring,
promotion, benefits, workplace culture, etc.?
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Hegemonic Normativity:
10) Do members of the plaintiff's protected group who work at the
same workplace support claims of discriminatory treatment? Are the
actions of the offending protected-group employee considered to be
uncivil or uncollegial by fellow members of the protected group? If
intersectionality issues are presented involving a plaintiff asserting
membership in more than one protected group (such as women of color),
then the appropriate intersectional group should be used to assess the
normative claim of discrimination or incivility.
a) If yes, have those members of the protected group who consider the
offending employee to be uncivil or uncollegial been rewarded with job
benefits by the administration or management?
If courts ask these questions of employers proffering a collegialitybased explanation to defend against discrimination claims and receive a
significant number of affirmative responses, courts should not only
withhold the standard deference granted to employers (especially
academic employers) on the determination of the importance and
existence of collegiality. They should also consider a significant number
of affirmative responses to reflect a presumption in favor of the
plaintiff's pretextual claims.
Only by adopting a more rigorous
questioning of the employer's stated collegiality-based rationale will
courts be able to work towards a more transformative definition of
collegiality.
C. Applying Transformative Collegiality Criteria
If we pause for a moment to reconsider the cases from Part I to see
how the plaintiffs there might fare under these new criteria for analyzing
allegedly uncollegial behavior, we see markedly different results. In
Love-Lane v. Martin, applying the ten questions above would reveal how
contingent the uncollegiality claim is to the plaintiff's original complaints
of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.
1.

"Same Claim" Derivativeness (Questions 1-3)

Question One inquires whether the uncollegiality claim and the
plaintiff's discrimination claim arise out of the same set of facts to help
ascertain whether the "not getting along" charge is truly legitimate and
non-discriminatory. In Love-Lane, the district court and Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals determined that the plaintiff did not proffer sufficient
evidence of pretext, and thereby accepted the employer's uncollegiality
rationale that the plaintiff had failed to respect the authority of her
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principal, Blanchfield, and to work effectively with Blanchfield and
"register [Love-Lane's] disagreements in private." 4 9 However, the
troubled relationship stems from facts that give rise to both Love-Lane's
discrimination/retaliation complaints, and the employer's uncollegiality
assertion - namely Love-Lane's attempts to criticize and change the
racial discrimination she perceived against African American boys at the
school, as well as the altercation with another teacher in her second-year
at Lewisville.' s
Immediately after Ms. Love-Lane began to speak out against the
"warehousing" policies in her second-year of teaching, the principal
found that 85 percent of fellow (white) teachers found Love-Lane to be
'1
"intimidating" and objected to her "direct style of communication. 51
Indeed as Question Two reveals, the very person at the core of LoveLane's complaints - principal Blanchfield (whom even the court
determined had been racially insensitive) 2 - is the very person with
whom the plaintiff is accused of "not getting along."
Absent the charge of not getting along with the supervisor against
whom she has claims, there is no other performance-based criteria upon
which the employer grounds its negative action against Love-Lane.'53
This absence invokes Question Three, which asks whether the
employer's negative action revolves solely or primarily around the
"getting along with others" standard. With all three questions answered
in the affirmative, it should be clear that plaintiff Love-Lane's
discrimination and retaliation complaints arise out of the same set of
facts as the claims about Love-Lane's inability to get along with
supervisor Blanchfield. The people Love-Lane allegedly cannot get
along with are the same ones who are implicated by her discrimination
claims.
Such a clear overlap between the plaintiff's original charges of
discrimination and the employer's asserted explanation (which arise out
of the same set of allegedly discriminatory events) should trigger
enhanced scrutiny of the employer's explanation for its adverse action
against the plaintiff-employee.
While it may be possible for the

,sLove-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 788 (2004).
I"
Ed. at 769-75.
12

Id. at 772.
Id. at 788.

"3 Id. at 774.
The negative performance assessment of Love-Lane by the employer
focused on three areas relating to the categories of "communication skills and efforts." A
careful read of the facts reflects that the employer's criticisms of Love-Lane's performance
relate back to incidents that comprise the plaintiff's discrimination complaints.
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employer's explanation to arise out of the same set of facts as the
plaintiff's discrimination claims and still be "legitimate and nondiscriminatory," I would argue that the finder of fact should look very
closely at the nature, quality, and consistence of the evidence presented
to support the uncollegiality claim, as well as the workplace equality
context as suggested by the remaining questions. If the employer's
defense rests primarily or only upon an alternate interpretation of the
same events constituting a discriminatory claim, then employer should
be required to provide corroboration of its uncollegiality claim in order
to render it reliably non-discriminatory, and not simply a byproduct of
discrimination.
2.

Nature, Quality, and Consistency of Evidence (Questions 4-7)

In Love-Lane, the first year of the plaintiff's employ at the Lewisville
school during which time she "was careful not to make any quick
judgments," there were no employer claims of her inability to get along
with others - either supervisors or co-workers 19 Not until Love-Lane
began to complain about the discriminatory treatment was she
characterized as "disrespectful," "unprofessional" and "intimidating."'55
Hence, Question Four, asking whether there is any evidence of
uncollegiality predating the underlying facts comprising the plaintiff's
discrimination complaint, is answered in the negative. In fact, prior to
her second year at Lewisville, Love-Lane had been receiving
performance reviews rating her excellent or superior in all aspects of her
job, ranking highest on problem-solving and communications. 6
Question Five, about the solicitation and dissemination of negative
information about an employee's relationship with co-workers, does not
appear to apply to the Love-Lane case, but figures prominently in the
Landgrafcase. There, the employer in the course of "investigating" the
employee's harassment complaint, saw fit to inquire of employees how
she got along with them.'5 7 Thus, the evidence of "not getting along" in
Landgraf's case was developed by the employer as a direct response to
her harassment claim. Courts and fact-finders should view the reliability
of such evidence highly suspect, as Question Five suggests.

..Id. at 771.
" Id. at 771-74.
1 Id. at 769.
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427,429 (5th Cir. 1992).
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3.

Workplace Imbalance/Equalization Efforts (Questions 8-9)

Insofar as the definition of collegiality suggests, it is a condition meant
to exist among equals. Thus, as I have argued, those attempts by
employees of protected groups to equalize the workplace (in terms of
representation, advancement, and environment) should be understood
to be consistent with bringing about a true collegiality in the workplace.
In other words, predictable conflict arising out of attempts by a protected
group to bring about greater equality in hiring, promotion, or general
workplace conditions should not be "charged" against the agents of
change consistent with the aims of Title VII. Just as fee-shifting statutes
are designed to create market incentives for "private attorneys general,"
so too must courts reconceptualize Title VII to provide incentives - not
deterrents - to employees initiating much needed cultural change in
their workplace.
To this end, it is important for courts and fact-finders to carefully
assess the workplace environment in which charges of uncollegiality
inhere. If the plaintiff is able to establish workplace imbalance of power
in terms of classic under-representation relative to a protected group's
available pool, or through the prevalence of stereotypes or comments
reflecting animus, then the court should subject the employer's assertion
of the plaintiff's alleged uncollegiality to greater scrutiny. Courts should
also take judicial notice of plaintiffs who have attempted to "equalize"
the workplace by bringing about better representation of the protected
group, better working conditions and opportunities for advancement, or
non-discriminatory policies or treatment generally. The final questions
attempt to address workplace equality and culture.
In answer to Questions Eight and Nine in Love-Lane, for example, the
plaintiff was an assistant principal at an "overwhelmingly white" school
where African American teachers comprised only about two to six
percent of the teaching staff." Love-Lane was likely the only African
American administrator. 9 The plaintiff's immediate supervisor and
school principal, Blanchfield, a white female, had made statements and
comments that even the court granting summary judgment to the
employer determined to be "racially insensitive. ""0 Thus, as answers to
1. Love-Lane

v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 770 (4th Cir. 2004).

" Id. Although the facts do not address the racial composition of the administration at
Lewisville, they do note that the superintendent assigned Love-Lane to the school because
"'an African American presence' was needed." Id. at 769. In addition, Love-Lane had
expressed her reservations to the superintendent at the time because she had heard that the
principal had difficulty in the past "dealing with African American assistants." Id.
1.Id. at 788.
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Questions Eight and Nine reflect, there were both statistical and
anecdotal indicators of workplace inequality as well as efforts by LoveLane to challenge discriminatory policies and treatment she observed as
negatively impacting African American students.
Under these
conditions, it is completely predictable that there will be conflict between
agents and opponents of positive racial change. But absent careful
questioning by the court and fact-finder to determine the reasons for
conflict and how to interpret them, the conflict may simply be used to
discredit a complaining plaintiff as a "troublemaker."
4.

Hegemonic Normativity (Question 10)

The last question attempts to go outside of hegemonic normativity to
assess the assertion of uncollegiality. Question Ten seems less applicable
to the facts as stated in Love-Lane as it inquires into whether other
members of the protected group either supported the plaintiff's attempts
to equalize the workplace or the employer's determination of the
plaintiff's inability to get along. However, the record does reflect that
the plaintiff had heard that principal Blanchfield "had difficulty in
dealing with African American assistants," and that one of the few
African American teachers at the school had commented that "serious
racial tension" developed between the school administration and staff
after Blanchfield became principal. 61 The Superintendent of Schools
admitted that "minority parents perceive Lewisville and Brenda
Blanchfield negatively." 62 And the school board's director of the African
American Infusion Project felt that "many teachers at Lewisville were
not receptive to diversity training" and that the principal did not seem to
address this problem of insensitivity or lack of interest."
When
confronting the "she said/she said" challenge of determining whether an
employer is forwarding an LNR invoking collegiality norms or an
illegitimate one merely derivative of the original discrimination, courts
should give greater weight to non-interestec parties of the protected
group that affirm either discrimination or uncollegiality (as long as they
do not have direct, material interests in affirming discrimination or
uncollegiality contention). Here, in addition to the African American
teacher and parents, there is even a defendant superintendent making
adverse statements affirming the racial insensitivity and negative racial

,"'Id. at 769.
162id.
'0 Id. at 771.
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perceptions of principal Blanchfield.'"
In concluding that Love-Lane did not prevail in demonstrating that
her employer's rationale of her inability to get along was merely pretext
for discrimination, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "[I]t is not
enough to disbelieve the defendants here; the fact-finder must believe
Love-Lane's explanation of intentional race discrimination." 165
So
although the plaintiff may have produced enough evidence for a factfinder to disbelieve the defendant-employer, she loses because she
cannot prove racial animus to satisfy the Fourth Circuit. Exactly what
sliver of evidence separates disbelief of the employer's LNR from
intentional racial discrimination is unclear and clearly subjective, and
therefore, normatively hegemonic given the demographic and employerfriendly composition of federal and appellate courts. It certainly matters,
therefore, whether the collegiality rationale is afforded a searching
inquiry, or none whatsoever.
The proposed ten criteria attempt to assist courts and fact-finders to
determine whether a collegiality rationale is truly non-discriminatory, or
whether it tips the scales towards establishing pretext. While concededly
not a comprehensive list (as yet), the criteria identified above begin to set
some standard for evaluating where uncollegiality claims of an employer
may be wholly rearticulating discrimination, and where they may be
able to stand on their own. I turn next to the cultural reframings
necessary to bring about greater equalization of the workplace, and
strategies to survive predictable ruptures in the workplace culture most
hazardous to the "agents of change."
D.

CulturalReframings: Taking Cultural Change Seriously and Developing
Strategiesfor Survival

Of course, proposed legal reforms go only so far, especially in the
realm of critical legal scholarship. Because the courts' treatment of the
collegiality rationale represents more of a socio-legal problem than an
individual shortcoming of plaintiffs, it is appropriate that a range of
strategies are considered for "outsider employees."
As such, my
remaining proposals address the strategies for cultural change and
survival in hostile environments in which collegiality may be used
against outsider employees.
1) Maintain strength in numbers. In order to defeat a white-normative
or hegemonic definition of collegiality, outsider employees must form
16 Id. at 769.
65

Id. at 788.
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support groups or "diversity collectives" or "equality collectives" to
discuss openly the ways in which "working identities" are interpreted
and cast in a raced, gendered, yet "colorblind" world and to guard
against pretextual charges of incivility or uncollegiality.
2) Practice "strategic activism." This takes full account of existing
workplace identity constructions to determine who should bring
forward complaints, concerns, or criticisms of management or
supervisors in a workplace with the least amount of negative
repercussions or retaliation.
3) Surface the operation of dominant normativities. Discuss white
normativity, heterosexual normativity, and male normativity as a
societal and workplace "given." Make more approachable insiders
aware of their insider status and how it may impact upon their
interpretation of the perceived value, contributions, as well as
transgressions of outsider colleagues.
4) Socialize or interact with insider colleagues with a critical mass of
insider colleagues. Greater interaction among insider and outsider
colleagues may help outsiders to see individual differences and the
autonomy of group members.
5) Contest or question inaccurate, negative interpretations of other
outsider employees. Too often, an outsider employee may adopt a
"comforting" strategy that aims to make the insiders feel comfortable
with difference. This strategy amounts to engaging in "degradation
ceremonies" - i.e., degrading one's larger out-group (e.g., racial
minority group) in order to differentiate and distance oneself from
affiliation with the dominant in-group (e.g., whites) to gain greater
acceptance by the in-group. Such a comforting strategy may be
understandable within the realities of "working identity," but more must
be expected of outsider employees in order to transform oppressive or
unequal worksites. In this regard, rather than "going along" with
negative assessments of outsiders in order to gain insider status, one
should reject, or at least question such negative assessments.
These doctrinal and cultural reframings represent only beginning
steps to begin unpacking an employer's collegiality-based rationale from
its discriminatory actions. I hope others who read and appreciate this
work will see fit to critique, refine, and supplement these reframings
with additional questions or inquiries. Most importantly, I offer these
sets of questions to open up the existing discussion of collegiality among
courts, scholars, and workers to consider how the transformative goal of
building truly equal worksites is often lost through the doctrine of
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antidiscrimination law, as well as post civil rights workplace cultures of
colorblindness and dominant normativities.
CONCLUSION

We are living in a post civil rights era. An era in which those who
speak out against discrimination are depicted as the cultural
transgressors. An era in which one who complains of mistreatment may
easily be "cast out of the sandbox." An era in which racial classifications
to remedy past discrimination are the moral equivalent to racial
classifications to perpetuate discrimination. 1' An era in which "playing
the race card" so-to-speak (which to some, means the mere mentioning
of acts of racism), is rendered the moral equivalent of a discriminatory or
hostile act by a racist.6 7 An era in which "race-thinking" and "raceconsciousness" are to be purged from our consciousness.'9 Indeed, race
has about the same level of public respectability as pornography. Both
are to be hidden out of sight, never to be considered by legitimate state
actors when making important decisions.
In a post civil rights era, serious forms of discrimination are
understood to have largely disappeared from the workplace.
Accordingly, courts have shifted dramatically since the brief period in
the early 1970s to mid 1970s, in which they attempted to ferret out

See, e.g., Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).

'

It is irrelevant whether a government's racial classifications are drawn by those
who wish to oppress a race or by those who have a sincere desire to help those
thought to be disadvantaged.. .. There can be no doubt that racial paternalism
and its unintended consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as any
other form of discrimination. . . . In my mind, government-sponsored racial
discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination
inspired by malicious prejudice. In each instance it is racial discrimination, plain
and simple.
Id.

Think back to the O.J. Simpson trial, where the successful litigation strategies of
Johnnie Cochran referring to the role that race and racism may have played in the
gathering of evidence against his client was commented upon as negatively (as "playing
the race card") as the acts of the white police officer, Mark Fuhrman, who admitted to
using the "n-word" and objected to interracial dating between Blacks and whites.
1" The language of Proposition 209 amending the California Constitution, the so-called
"Civil Rights Initiative" banning the consideration of race or gender-based affirmative
action in education and employment, provides an ominous example of this racial
transcendence. CAL. CONST. art. I, §. 31, provides in pertinent part: "'The State shall not
discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the
basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment,
public education, or public contracting."'
167
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discrimination in the work environment using creative doctrines such as
"disparate impact" as noted in the Griggs v. Duke Power case." Today,
courts are more likely to deny the existence of discrimination in the
workplace by imposing higher standards of causation, higher burdens
for plaintiffs, and higher hurdles for interpreting "inferential" modes of
discrimination.
By heightening the requirements for a successful
employment discrimination claim, unsuccessful plaintiffs simply appear
as though their cases lack merit.
The employment discrimination cases described in Part I in which
courts applied a traditional understanding of collegiality in employment
discrimination worked to the detriment of female plaintiffs attempting to
remediate hostile work environments. By supporting such powerinsensitive definitions of "collegiality" and valorizing "getting along
with [oppressive] co-workers," courts normalize hostility in the
workplace. Collegiality as defined in these cases must be challenged in
both law and culture, in favor of a more "relational" power-sensitive
definition that takes into consideration the existence and extent of
unequal power relations in the workplace. I advocate for a more explicit
recognition of, and accountability for, the uncritical legal and cultural
definitions of collegiality that are power-insensitive. These uncritical,
power-insensitive definitions of collegiality pervade both the workplace
and courts and serve to censor claims of race- and gender-based
workplace hostility.
More than four decades after Dr. King smuggled out of prison and
published his celebrated Letter from a Birmingham Jail, we face courts and
cultures that still support a hegemonic notion of what getting along in
the workplace means, de-contextualizing power relations and ideals of
social transformation from the inquiry into what does and what does not
constitute acceptable, collegial behavior. The judiciary's current Kafkaesque approach asking the alleged offender of equality to determine
whether the complaining plaintiff "plays nicely with others" (including
those who may have contributed to a hostile or discriminatory work
environment) allows bad faith employers to play a "collegiality trump
card" against employees claiming employment discrimination. Had we
allowed norms of the Birmingham Eight on the appropriateness of Dr.
King's "unwise," "untimely," and "extreme" strategies to have dictated

16 In Griggs, the Court recognized a new theory and proof structure for employment
discrimination that transcended intent to address neutral devices that produce disparate
impact upon protected groups. Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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the pace and course of the African American freedom struggle, one
wonders what kind of world we would find ourselves in today.

